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Chapter 1 
Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution: Lessons from the History of U.S. 
Environmental Law 
Robert V. Percival 
 
One of the most important functions of government is to protect public health and the 
environment from exposure to environmental risk. Through the enactment of environmental 
laws governments have established regulatory programs that seek to provide comprehensive 
protection against environmental harm. Yet regulatory policy inevitably must confront 
considerable uncertainty in assessing risks and determining how to control them most 
effectively. As society struggles to forge rough consensus over appropriate approaches to 
regulation in the face of this uncertainty, decisions to regulate or not to regulate individual 
products, chemicals, or pollutants often generate enormous controversy. 
 
The precautionary principle wisely counsels that lack of full scientific certainty should not 
preclude the adoption of prudent precautionary measures to prevent harm. Although the 
precautionary principle has been widely embraced, it often is misunderstood and it even has 
become a focus of controversy (Percival 2006) Regulatory policy generally seeks to prevent 
harm before it occurs, but the reality is that it usually has been more reactive than 
precautionary, responding only after harm has become manifest (Percival 1998; Percival et al. 
2009). As regulators seek to improve their responses to new and emerging environmental 
risks, it is useful to consider what lessons can be learned from past experience with regulatory 
policy.  
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This chapter reviews controversies over regulatory policy through the lens of history. Part 1 
discusses the precautionary principle and why it is valuable even if it does not purport to 
answer the question of how stringent regulatory policy should be. Part 2 considers recent 
studies that assess whether regulatory policy is more precautionary in the United States (U.S.) 
or the European Union (EU) and why it is difficult to make confident, comparative 
conclusions. Part 3 then examines the history of how precaution has been incorporated into 
U.S. environmental law. It demonstrates that, despite the law’s promise to prevent harm 
before it occurs, regulatory policy has been largely reactive, concentrating primarily on highly 
visible problems only after harm has become manifest. After reviewing the state of 
contemporary regulatory politics in the U.S., Part 4 analyzes lessons that can be learned to 
improve future regulatory policy. 
 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Globalization and expanding world trade are creating new pressures to harmonize 
environmental standards. Countries increasingly are borrowing legal and regulatory policy 
innovations from one another, moving toward greater harmonization of regulatory policies. 
As traditional distinctions between domestic and international law and private and public law 
are blurring, I have argued that a new kind of ‘global environmental law’ is emerging. 
(Percival 2009; Yang and Percival 2009; Percival 2011). Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and national regulatory officials increasingly coordinate their activities on a global 
scale. Even countries with very different legal and political traditions are borrowing legal and 
regulatory innovations from each other. For example, the European Union’s program 
requiring registration, evaluation, authorization and restriction of chemicals (REACH) is 
becoming highly influential in shaping approaches to chemical regulation in countries outside 
of the EU (see section II). 
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The Precautionary Principle 
As global environmental law has developed, one of the most broadly adopted concepts has 
been the precautionary principle. Although there are different formulations of the 
precautionary principle, the most widely embraced is the one articulated in Principle 15 of the 
Rio Declaration, signed by representatives of 178 nations at the United Nations Summit on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. This states: ‘In order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation’.1 This version of the precautionary principle does not purport to 
dictate how precautionary regulatory policy should be. Rather it states only that if there are 
threats of significant harm, scientific uncertainty should not serve as an excuse to reject cost-
effective, preventive measures. It does not specify how significant the harm must be to trigger 
a regulatory response or what particular preventive measures should be undertaken to address 
it. Thus, the precautionary principle should not be viewed as an effort to establish any 
particular, prescriptive decision rule. 
 
The Rio Declaration’s statement of the precautionary principle has been widely embraced in 
subsequent international agreements. Some argue that the principle now is so widely accepted 
that it should be recognized as customary international law. Others disagree (Zander 2010). 
Language virtually identical to the Rio Declaration’s articulation of the precautionary 
principle was incorporated into the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change2 and in 
the Preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity.3 The EU has expressly endorsed the 
precautionary principle and incorporated it in some of its regulatory directives. The 
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Maastricht Treaty of 1992 adopted the precautionary principle without explaining what it 
provides, and today Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
refers to the precautionary principle as part of environmental policy. 
 
In February 2000 the European Commission issued a Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle to explain in considerable detail its views concerning what the principle is and how 
it should be applied in EU environmental policy decisions.4 The U.S. government has been 
reluctant to embrace the precautionary principle, even though it generally is consistent with 
the thrust of most U.S. environmental laws, as discussed below.  
 
Criticisms of the Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle has come under fire from critics who believe that it will 
exacerbate what they perceive as a overly stringent regulatory policies. Frank Cross argues 
that ‘the precautionary principle is deeply perverse in its implications for the environment and 
human welfare’ (Cross 1996). Bjørn Lomborg argues that if it is used to strengthen 
environmental regulations, ‘the precautionary principle is actually all about making worse 
decisions than we need to’ (Lomborg 2001). Robert Hahn and Cass Sunstein argue that ‘taken 
seriously, the precautionary principle can be paralyzing, providing no direction at all’ (Hahn 
and Sunstein 2005). Sunstein argues that the precautionary principle is incoherent, potentially 
paralyzing, and that it will lead regulators to make bad choices (Sunstein 2005). Implicit in 
their arguments is the notion that society faces greater peril from overly precautionary 
regulations than from risks whose effect on human health and the environment is not fully 
understood at present.  
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To a large extent critics of the precautionary principle (e.g., Cross 1996; Hahn and Sunstein 
2005; Sunstein 2005) are attacking a straw man. Because the precautionary principle does not 
purport to dictate stringent precautionary regulatory policy should be, it cannot fairly be 
blamed for perceived instances of overregulation, as I previously have argued (Percival 2006). 
The essential notion embodied in the precautionary principle -- that uncertainty should not be 
used as an excuse to eschew cost-effective preventive measures – is unassailable. It does not 
require that innovation come to a halt whenever any risks may be conjured. Properly 
understood, the precautionary principle is neither incoherent, paralyzing, nor a prescription 
for overregulation. Rather it cautions that regulatory policy should be proactive in responding 
to uncertainty concerning potentially serious threats to human health and the environment, 
mindful of the potential consequences for future generations.  
 
Critics of the precautionary principle concede that the formulation articulated in the Rio 
Declaration is unobjectionable, but they point to the ‘Wingspread Statement on the 
Precautionary Principle’, drafted by a group of academics attending a conference in January 
1998. The Wingspread Statement includes the sentence: ‘When an activity raises threats of 
harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if 
some cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically’. They use the 
Wingspread Statement as a straw man to imply that proponents of the precautionary principle 
seek to prohibit any activity that has the potential to cause harm. However, this is a gross 
distortion of both the Wingspread Statement and the precautionary principle. It has not been 
embraced by the larger environmental community or regulatory policymakers. The 
precautionary principle does not mandate that regulators ban or forego all new technologies. 
Instead it supports a nuanced range of regulatory responses and ‘a flexible degree of risk 
aversion’ (Applegate 2002). Its critics’ claim that society should not ignore potential negative 
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consequences of precautionary regulation ‘is a trivial observation for no serious proponent of 
the precautionary principle disagrees with it’ (Kysar 2010). The critics’ ‘crudely absolutist’ 
caricature of the precautionary principle is simply inaccurate because the principle is ‘merely 
one aspect of a much more elaborate regulatory process in which the precautionary principle 
is applied with a view toward proportionality of response and adaptability over time’ (Kysar 
2010). 
 
The most vociferous critics of the precautionary principle argue that cost-benefit analysis is a 
superior decision tool for regulatory policy because it promises objectivity (e.g., Graham and 
Wiener 1995; Sunstein 2005). Unlike the precautionary principle, which does not purport to 
dictate how precautionary regulation should be, cost-benefit analysis counsels that regulation 
should not be so stringent as to generate compliance costs that exceed the benefits of 
regulation. Yet the conceptual and empirical difficulty of estimating regulatory costs and 
benefits actually renders cost-benefit analysis to be a highly uncertain decision tool, albeit one 
that at its core lacks both ‘the virtues of humility and self-awareness that lie at [the] core’ of 
the precautionary principle (Kysar 2010: 250). 
 
Critics of the precautionary principle believe that it will lead to overregulation and that it even 
may cause more harm than it prevents. They argue that it will deprive society of ‘opportunity 
benefits’ that could prevent even greater harm or that regulation that it inspires will induce 
substitution of products or activities that pose even greater risks than those caused by the 
regulatory target (Cross 1996; Graham and Wiener 1995). Yet there is no basis for assuming 
that risks that are sufficiently salient to spawn precautionary regulation are systematically 
more likely to be less risky that the unknown risks of potential substitutes. ‘Risk-risk’ trade-
off analysis is flawed as a decision tool because it focuses only on ancillary risks generated by 
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regulation while ignoring regulation’s ancillary benefits (Rascoff and Revesz 2002). The 
ancillary benefits of regulation (e.g., the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of ozone-depleting 
substances also reducing greenhouse gases), often are highly significant and there is no reason 
to believe that they systematically would be less than any ancillary risks of regulation. 
 
In his book The Laws of Fear Cass Sunstein argues that the public is overly fearful of certain 
immediate risks that are statistically less dangerous than what could substitute for them if 
regulators respond to public demands for precaution (Sunstein 2005). But Sunstein’s account 
ignores the great difficulty of generating political support for regulations that impose 
immediate, and often visible, costs in order to produce diffuse, and less visible, future benefits 
(Dana 2003). Embrace of the precautionary principle actually may help overcome political 
obstacles to collective action to protect against environmental risks. Even Sunstein concedes 
that some form of the precautionary principle can be useful in responding to risks that are too 
uncertain to be amenable to cost-benefit analysis, such as particular catastrophic risks and the 
destruction of biodiversity. 
 
The precautionary principle does not purport to dictate how precautionary regulatory policy 
should be. Instead it is directed only at deeming a particular argument (‘lack of full scientific 
certainty’) as unacceptable as a justification for postponing cost-effective actions to prevent 
serious or irreversible harm (Sandin et al. 2002). Decisions concerning how much protection 
to afford public health and the environment are embodied in the environmental laws countries 
adopt, which represent the authoritative declarations of how precautionary regulatory policy 
should be. These laws generally do not prescribe any all-encompassing decision rule for 
setting regulatory policy. Instead they embrace a wide range of regulatory approaches while 
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identifying a host of relevant factors for officials to consider in making regulatory decisions 
(Percival 2009).  
 
The notion that embrace of the precautionary principle will result in overregulation also is 
amply refuted by the European Commission’s Communication outlining guidelines for using 
the precautionary principle.5 The Communication, which was subsequently endorsed by both 
the European Parliament and the EU Council of Ministers, emphasized flexibility in applying 
the precautionary principle to combat ‘potentially dangerous effects deriving from a 
phenomenon, product or process [that] have been identified’, when ‘scientific evaluation does 
not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty’. The Communication advised 
that regulatory responses to risk should be ‘proportional’, ‘non-discriminatory’, and 
‘consistent with similar measures already taken’. It endorsed the use of cost-benefit analysis 
to inform regulatory decisions and it also recognized the importance of reviewing interim 
regulatory measures in light of new scientific evidence.  
 
As contributors to Michelle Everson and Ellen Vos’s book Uncertain Risks Regulated 
emphasize, various countries and institutions apply the precautionary principle in different 
ways when addressing particular sources of environmental risk. (Everson and Vos 2009). This 
is not surprising in light of the different social, cultural, economic and political factors that 
influence what risks are targeted by regulatory policy in different countries. As countries 
increasingly borrow regulatory innovations from one another, cross-cultural differences in 
regulatory policy are narrowing and the precautionary principle is becoming increasingly 
popular even though it does not purport to provide any specific decision rule to answers the 
‘how safe is “safe”’ question. 
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COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF REGULATORY POLICY 
In recent years a rich literature has developed comparing regulatory policies in different 
countries and assessing the influence of the precautionary principle. In addition to the 
literature cited above (Everson and Vos 2009; Zander 2010), David Vogel’s study of The 
Politics of Precaution (Vogel 2012) and Jonathan Wiener’s anthology on The Reality of 
Precaution (Wiener et al. 2011) provide detailed analyses of how regulatory policy in the 
U.S. and EU have responded to a wide range of environmental and safety risks. Both are 
excellent books that present valuable data, while reaching distinctly different conclusions 
concerning whether regulatory policy is more precautionary in the EU or the U.S. 
 
Wiener’s ‘Regulatory Parity’ Thesis 
Wiener concludes that even though the EU has more explicitly embraced the precautionary 
principle, its member states are not more precautionary than the U.S. in addressing health, 
safety, environmental and security risks. Based on several case studies comparing the history 
of regulation in the EU and the U.S. and a quantitative analysis of a sample of 100 risks, 
Wiener believes that ‘Europe and the United States have maintained rough parity across all 
risks over the past four decades’ (Wiener et al. 2011: 521). Europe is more precautionary than 
the U.S. in dealing with some risks; the U.S. is more precautionary in dealing with others. 
Wiener concludes that the U.S. is now more precautionary than the EU in dealing with the 
risks of mad cow disease, diesel engine exhaust, particulate air pollution, environmental 
tobacco smoke, biodiversity loss and terrorism. The EU is now more precautionary in 
responding to the risks of growth hormones in beef, genetically modified foods, stratospheric 
ozone destruction, climate change, and chemical risks. 
 
10 
Wiener frames his conclusion as a surprise in light of the EU’s more explicit embrace of the 
precautionary principle. Yet even if one accepts the notion of rough parity in regulatory 
stringency between the U.S. and EU, it does not contradict the notion that the EU more 
faithfully adheres to the precautionary principle in its regulatory policy. The relative 
stringency of regulation is not necessarily an accurate indicator of fidelity to the precautionary 
principle because the principle does not purport to dictate how stringent regulatory policy 
should be (Percival 2006). 
 
To be sure, a nation that frequently succumbs to the argument that uncertainty precludes all 
regulatory action is likely to have less stringent regulations than a nation that faithfully 
embraces the precautionary principle. But countries in the former (‘reactive’) category may 
adopt stringent regulatory responses in reaction to highly visible disasters (e.g., terrorist 
attacks or a nuclear accident like the Fukushima Daiichi tragedy) that are less likely to occur 
in countries in the latter (‘precautionary’) category. 
 
Vogel and the ‘Flip-Flop’ toward Greater Precaution in the EU 
In his book The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in 
Europe and the United States (Vogel 2012) David Vogel concludes that although the U.S. 
was more precautionary than Europe during the 1970s and early 1980s, the EU today is more 
precautionary than the U.S. in dealing with risks to human health and the environment. Vogel 
emphasizes tighter EU regulation of chemical substances, greenhouse gas emissions, 
agriculture, food, and consumer products. 
 
According to Vogel, this shift is the result of political changes in both countries. He cites 
three factors. First, ‘[d]uring the last two decades, Europeans have perceived more health, 
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safety, and environmental risks caused by business to be both credible and politically 
unacceptable than have Americans’ (Vogel 2012: 34). Second, the politics of regulatory 
policy in the U.S. has become more ‘polarized along ideological and partisan lines’ (Vogel 
2012: 35) as politicians supported by business interests have sought to demonize regulation. 
Third, greater emphasis on risk assessment and less deferential judicial review in the U.S. has 
‘increased the level of scientific evidence necessary to justify new risk regulations’. Recent 
developments in the U.S., including the debate over regulatory policy during the 2012 U.S. 
presidential campaign, provide powerful support for Vogel’s second and third arguments.  
 
Comparative Regulatory Policy: An Assessment 
Globalization and Regulatory Diversity 
 
Both Wiener’s and Vogel’s studies provide powerful support for the notion that globalization 
is having a profound effect on the evolution of environmental law. In particular, they 
emphasize that neither the EU nor the U.S. should be viewed as a regulatory monolith. In the 
U.S. the state of California has adopted more aggressive policies to control climate change 
and exposure to toxic chemicals than the federal government. These policies have been 
modelled on the regulatory approach of the EU (Vogel 2012: 16). Vogel acknowledges that 
‘the nature and mechanisms of global regulatory emulation and policy diffusion have shifted’, 
but he concludes that ‘the EU, rather than the American federal government’ is now the entity 
playing the most ‘important role in strengthening the risk regulations of many of its trading 
partners’. He argues that the ‘California effect’ has become the ‘EU effect’ with other 
countries now importing regulatory innovations from the EU, rather than from California. 
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Wiener also acknowledges the diversity of approaches to regulation employed by California 
and different EU members. He concedes that the EU now regulates chemicals more 
stringently than the U.S., but he questions whether there has been any fundamental ‘flop’ 
toward greater regulatory stringency toward chemicals in the EU. Wiener appears to seriously 
underestimate the significance of the EU’s REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals) program as well as EU directives on electronic waste6 and 
hazardous substances in electronics and electrical equipment.7 These programs represent 
enormous advances in precautionary regulation that have become highly influential in moving 
global regulatory policy in a more precautionary direction. REACH requires pre-market 
toxicity testing of chemicals, both old and new, and it creates incentives to substitute safer 
chemicals without requiring elaborate proof that harm actually has occurred. WEEE and 
RoHS seek to reduce the presence of toxic chemicals in various products and to ensure their 
safe disposal. 
 
The Global Reach of REACH 
 
The EU’s REACH program has had a profound effect on chemical regulation worldwide. It 
established the European Chemical Agency (ECHA) to manage and coordinate chemical 
regulation and it requires registration of all chemical substances used in the EU, evaluation of 
those that may be harmful, and authorization for substances believed to pose the greatest 
risks. A data gathering process is required of all chemicals, both old and new, that are 
produced in or sold in quantities greater than one metric ton per year. This must be completed 
between 2007 and 2018, beginning with substances of very high concern (SVHC), substances 
known to be very toxic to aquatic organisms, and substances supplied in quantities greater 
than 1,000 metric tons per year. By 1 June 2018 all substances supplied in quantities greater 
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than 1 metric ton per year must be registered. Unregistered substances may not be 
manufactured in the EU or exported to the EU after 1 June 2018. 
 
All chemical registration applications must be accompanied by a technical dossier, a 
comprehensive set of information on the chemical’s properties, and registration applications 
for chemicals produced in quantities above ten metric tons per year must be accompanied by a 
Chemical Safety Report. Authorization is required only for SVHC. These substances include 
those that cause cancer or mutations or disrupt reproductive processes (CMRs), persistent, 
bioaccumulative, or toxic substances (PBTs), very persistent or very bioaccumulative 
substances (vPvBs), persistent organic pollutants (POPs), and other chronic hazards. 
Substances of very high concern (SVHC) must be specifically authorized before they can be 
used and their manufacturers must find safer replacement substances or ensure that they are 
‘adequately controlled’. If a SVHC is sold, the manufacturer must prove that the benefits 
outweigh the risks. Thus, manufacturers are faced with a strong incentive to find safer 
substitutes rather than endure the authorization process or have their products banned from the 
market entirely.  
 
Because it applies to foreign manufacturers of products sold in the EU, REACH has had a 
significant influence throughout the world. Dow Chemical, which estimates that compliance 
with REACH will cost it between $100 million and $250 million over eleven years, 
announced in 2008 that it has decided to prepare REACH-qualifying dossiers for all its 
chemical products, not just those sold in the EU. (Vogel 2012: 169). REACH is a model for 
California’s Green Chemistry Initiative, although California’s approach is not as 
comprehensive as the EU’s.8 Inspired by REACH, Massachusetts in 2008 unanimously 
passed a ‘safer alternatives’ law to encourage safer substitutions for ten toxic chemicals. 
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In January 2010 China introduced its updated chemical notification program, Measures on 
Environmental Management of New Chemical Substances, or Order 7. Order 7 became 
effective on 15 October 2010. Turkey has enacted chemical regulation legislation that 
resembles REACH; it came into force in January 2010. The law prioritizes testing of 
substances based on their potential effects on health and the environment and subjects 
substances with carcinogenic and mutagenic effects to ‘specific scrutiny’. 
 
Although Wiener’s study questions the relevance of REACH to the precautionary principle, 
REACH promotes precautionary regulation in two fundamental respects. First, it shifts the 
burden of proving safety to manufacturers of chemicals (Naiki 2010). Secondly, it requires 
them to search for safer substitutes for chemicals shown to pose the greatest risks. When it 
adopted REACH, the ‘European Parliament specifically rejected the United States’ model of 
chemical regulation by adopt[ing] the precautionary principle; REACH, in effect, preempts 
complete scientific proof of the harm of a chemical by placing the burden of proving a 
chemical's safety on the industry’ (Benedetto 2010). 
 
REACH responds to uncertainty by mandating data gathering to reduce it. In 2001 the 
European Environment Agency completed an inquiry into why government regulators failed 
to prevent more than a dozen significant environmental problems caused by radiation 
exposure, benzene, asbestos, PCBs, MTBE and other harmful substances (European 
Environment Agency 2001). Its report, ‘Late Lessons from Early Warnings’, emphasized the 
importance of long-term monitoring and research to reduce ignorance concerning chronic 
environmental hazards, including those that may cause significant harm with a considerable 
latency period. REACH’s chemical testing program represents a giant step in this direction. 
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‘[M]ore data on chemicals have been assembled and made available to the supply chain and to 
the public at large than ever before,’ as a result of REACH, which ‘stimulates risk-
management measures and chemical substitutions that enhance safety’ (Abelkop et al. 2012: 
11043). 
 
The EU also has been a pioneer in promoting the notion of producer responsibility for waste 
and the importance of reducing the generation of toxic residues from electronic products. The 
EU’s Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) has affected product regulation on a global 
scale. China, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan promptly responded to RoHS by adjusting product 
designs to eliminate the six toxic chemicals banned under RoHS to ensure continued access to 
the EU market.  
 
The Influence of Historical Differences Between Civil and Common Law Regimes 
 
Professor Noga Morag-Levine has conducted extensive research into the historical roots of 
differences in patterns of risk regulation between common law (the United Kingdom and the 
U.S) and civil law (continental Europe) countries (Morag-Levine 2011). She argues that 
contemporary regulatory policy differences between the EU and the U.S. actually can be 
traced to centuries of divergences between Europe’s civil law tradition and the common law 
tradition inherited by the United States from the United Kingdom (Morag-Levine 2011). 
Professor Morag-Levine argues that European countries with a civil law tradition favour 
technology-based regulation as a product of their greater receptivity to the precautionary 
principle. She maintains that this is a more effective approach to preventing environmental 
harm than the ‘the American regulatory paradigm’, which ‘aspires to scientific determination 
of the level of pollution mitigation required’ (Morag-Levine 2003: 180). 
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While precautionary regulation emerged in Britain with the adoption of the Alkali Act in 
1863, Morag-Levine argues that this Act was directly inspired by French and other 
continental regulatory models developed under the civil law tradition. This makes it ‘easier to 
reconcile the civil law character of precautionary regulation with the evident presence of that 
instrument in Victorian Britain’ (Morag-Levine 2011: 1). Since the 1980s, differences 
between British and continental approaches to regulation have narrowed significantly, but 
Morag-Levine maintains that the historical roots of these divergences still have considerable 
explanatory power in understanding contemporary differences between U.S. and EU 
regulatory policy.  
 
U.S. environmental law may in fact be somewhat more precautionary than Morag-Levine’s 
description (Percival 2004), but her conclusion that continental Europe historically has been 
more precautionary than the U.S. has considerable historical support. Her research into the 
historical roots of current regulatory policy differences suggests that divergences in legal 
traditions may remain an obstacle to greater harmonization of global regulatory policy. 
Although it is difficult to make confident conclusions concerning whether regulatory policy is 
more precautionary in the U.S. or the EU, comparative study of this history can yield some 
rich lessons for improving future regulatory policy. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRECAUTION IN U.S. REGULATORY POLICY 
This section summarizes the history of environmental risk regulation in the United States, 
which I have discussed in more detail in previous work (Percival 2006). In the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries regulatory policy focused only on the most noticeable environmental 
risks such as exploding steamship boilers (Rabin 1986) or smelter pollution that visibly 
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altered the surrounding landscape (Percival et al. 2009). Highly publicized incidents of harm 
(e.g., workers dying in the first tetraethyl lead manufacturing plant or deaths from radiation 
exposure of workers using radium to paint watch dials) generated public clamour for action. 
Prior to the advent of comprehensive, national regulatory programs to protect public health, 
the official response to such incidents was to convene conferences of experts. However, 
regulatory policy rarely was able to prevent harm from less visible risks posed by chronic, 
low-level exposures to toxic substances such as lead. Common law liability actions provided 
some measure of redress for pollution that caused the most obvious environmental harm to 
private property, but the common law ultimately proved to be too crude a vehicle for 
safeguarding public health when humans are exposed to multiple environmental risks from 
numerous sources. 
 
During the decade of the 1970s, the U.S. Congress adopted a series of comprehensive 
regulatory programs to protect public health and the environment. These programs were the 
product of an extraordinary outpouring of public support for environmental protection, fuelled 
by the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (Carson 1962), which helped inspire the 
first Earth Day in April 1970. The initial generation of regulatory programs to protect the 
environment incorporated a variety of approaches to determining how precautionary 
regulatory policy should be -- including technology-based regulation, health-based regulation, 
and risk-benefit balancing. Regulations issued to implement these new statutes spawned a 
host of legal challenges from regulated industries. U.S. courts hearing these challenges 
initially endorsed precautionary regulation,9 while expressing concern about how 
precautionary regulatory policy should be. 
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In December 1973, EPA issued its first regulations limiting the amount of tetraethyl lead that 
could be added to gasoline to 0.5 gpg for all gasoline produced. Lead-additive manufacturers 
challenged EPA’s decision in court. In December 1974, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the regulations by a 2-1 vote. The 
court held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that lead emissions ‘will endanger the 
public health or welfare’, as required by the Clean Air Act because it found that ‘the case 
against auto lead emissions is a speculative and inconclusive one at best’. The EPA appealed 
this decision to the full court, which agreed to rehear the case. In March 1976, the court by a 
5-4 vote reversed the three-judge panel's decision and upheld the lead standard.10 
 
In a decision that stands as a landmark in its endorsement of precautionary regulation, the 
court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to regulate lead additives even though it could 
not be proven with certainty that they endanger public health. The court emphasized the 
precautionary nature of the Clean Air Act’s regulatory mandate. ‘Regulatory action may be 
taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed the very existence of ... precautionary 
legislation would seem to demand that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the 
perceived threat’. 
 
The tetraethyl lead manufacturers argued that there was no definitive proof that emissions of 
lead from gasoline caused harm. They maintained that EPA was required to present some 
‘dispositive study’ to demonstrate that lead additives in gasoline had caused lead poisoning in 
individuals. The court acknowledged the lack of ‘hard proof of any danger’, but it rejected the 
notion that such proof was necessary before precautionary regulation could be implemented. 
‘Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal -- to the extent that even science can be certain 
of its truth. But certainty in the complexities of environmental medicine may be achievable 
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only after the fact ... Awaiting certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive 
regulation’.11 After reviewing the 10,000-page record, the court rejected the industry's claim 
that a ‘dispositive study’ had to support EPA’s determination, noting that ‘[b]y its nature, 
scientific evidence is cumulative’. The court noted the difficulties inherent in determining 
whether or not lead emissions endanger health, including the existence of multiple sources of 
human exposure to lead and the difficulties of conducting controlled experiments on humans. 
However, it upheld EPA’s regulation by emphasizing the precautionary purpose of the statute:  
 
‘Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, 
uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the 
regulations designed to protect public health, and the decision that of an expert 
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. 
Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is to 
be served’. 
 
The Ethyl decision remains a landmark in environmental law because of its endorsement of 
the precautionary principle long before it became a staple of global environmental policy. The 
decision established that precautionary regulation could be based ‘on the inconclusive but 
suggestive results of numerous studies’ indicating that exposure to a substance could 
endanger health even in the absence of conclusive proof that such adverse health effects 
actually had occurred. It also indicated that courts would be deferential in reviewing the 
judgment of the EPA Administrator in assessing the significance of scientific evidence.  
 
Four years later, when confronted with the petroleum industry’s claim that tighter limits on 
worker exposure to benzene would cripple the industry while providing scant benefit to public 
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health, the U.S. Supreme Court mandated that, prior to regulating workplace hazards, the U.S. 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) should use risk assessment to 
determine that the risks to be regulated were ‘significant’ and could be appreciably reduced 
by regulation.12 The Court did not specify any specific threshold of ‘significance’, but it 
indicated that it probably would lie somewhere between a 1 in 1000 risk that would be 
considered significant and a 1 in 1 billion risk that probably would not. A plurality of the 
Court concluded that a statutory command to establish a standard that ‘most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence’, that ‘no worker 
suffers material impairment of health of functional capacity’, did not automatically require 
reducing exposure to carcinogens to the lowest feasible level. Instead the Court conditioned 
precautionary regulation on the making of threshold findings that such regulation would 
appreciably reduce risks that appear to be substantial.  
 
The Court’s plurality decision did not represent a wholesale rejection of the precautionary 
approach to regulation. In fact the Court expressly endorsed the notion that conservative 
default assumptions could be used in risk assessment (so long as ‘they are supported by a 
body of reputable scientific thought’). The Court also specified that risk assessment need not 
be quantitative, particularly when uncertainty precludes confident quantitative assessments of 
risk. 
 
By requiring OSHA to assess risks and to determine that they are ‘significant’ enough to 
warrant regulation, the Supreme Court fashioned its own kind of ‘regulatory common law’. It 
placed a greater burden on agencies seeking to adopt precautionary regulation, but ultimately 
this has not proven to be a significant barrier to regulation. In the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s Industrial Union (‘Benzene’) decision, U.S. regulatory agencies have relied heavily 
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on risk assessments to justify regulatory decisions even though many risks are impossible to 
assess with precision. Risk assessment models are most highly developed for carcinogens that 
pose health risks in probabilistic fashion, but ecological risks and non-cancer health effects 
are far more difficult to model (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1987). Enormous 
uncertainties also surround the risks of new and emerging technologies, such as biotechnology 
and nanotechnology. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision ultimately meant that workers had to tolerate exposure to 
dangerous levels of benzene for nearly a decade longer than OSHA initially had intended 
when it promulgated an emergency temporary standard in 1977. That standard had been 
invalidated by a lower court that held that the agency had failed to demonstrate the need to act 
on an emergency basis. Although it was not until 1987 that OSHA ultimately lowered the 
permissible exposure limit for benzene to the very level it had sought to adopt a decade 
earlier, by then the evidence of the significant risks posed by benzene had become so 
overwhelming that OSHA’s decision was not even challenged in court. 
 
The enactment of environmental legislation often has required some ‘trigger event’, usually a 
highly publicized incident of visible environmental harm that generates immediate public 
concern (Percival 1998). Examples include the ‘Superfund’ legislation adopted in 1980 after 
highly publicized contamination of homes in Love Canal by previously buried hazardous 
wastes, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act adopted in 1986 in 
response to the Bhopal tragedy, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 adopted in response to the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
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As Vogel cogently demonstrates, U.S. regulatory policy depends in large part on the policy 
preferences of political leaders (Vogel 2012: 34). Because President Reagan was ideologically 
opposed to regulation, Congressional distrust of his executive agencies spawned a backlash 
that led Congress to strengthen the U.S. environmental laws during the 1980s. When it 
reauthorized the federal regulatory statutes, Congress added new provisions specifying actions 
that regulatory agencies must take coupled with statutory deadlines for completing them. It 
also adopted far-reaching legislation in 1986 requiring companies to make annual public 
disclosures concerning their emissions of toxic chemicals.13 During the same year California 
voters adopted the highly precautionary Proposition 65, which prohibits companies from 
exposing humans without warning to significant risks from carcinogens or reproductive toxins 
and which places the burden of proof of companies to show that risks are insignificant.  
 
Even though nearly all U.S. environmental statutes authorize regulation prior to definitive 
proof of harm, it is easier to identify hazards and to predict harm after it occurs. In part due to 
enormous political pressures from the regulated community, federal agencies usually wait for 
proof of harm before adopting regulations. Most of the chemicals that have been stringently 
regulated in the U.S. became the focus of regulatory attention only after highly publicized 
incidents in which they caused visible and substantial harm (Percival 2006). This reflects the 
facts that regulation is most politically salient when it responds to highly visible harm that 
already has occurred. Rather than realizing its promise of preventative regulation, U.S. 
environmental policy usually has been saddled with the far more difficult task of remediating 
environmental contamination after it has occurred.  
 
The European Environmental Agency’s Late Lessons from Early Warnings study is one of the 
few studies to examine why society has failed to prevent chronic environmental harm from 
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toxic substances, such as lead and asbestos, that long were known to be extremely hazardous. 
Because the neurological harm caused by exposure to lead is largely invisible, efforts to 
control lead exposure were only successful after decades of damage to public health. This 
stands in sharp contrast with the regulatory response to the stratospheric ozone depletion 
problem, a rare instance in which truly precautionary regulation was undertaken solely in 
response to a seemingly compelling scientific theory before actual harm to public health had 
been demonstrated (Benedick 1991). 
 
As noted above, the judicial system has played an important role in developing U.S. 
environmental policy through judicial review of agency regulatory decisions. The U.S. 
Administrative Procedure Act and the federal environmental statutes generally authorize 
judicial review of agency action at the behest of anyone adversely affected by it. Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to defer to agency interpretations of 
ambiguous regulatory statutes,14 significant regulatory initiatives have been derailed by the 
courts. In 1989, after a decade-long investigation, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) issued a regulation phasing out nearly all remaining uses of asbestos. The agency 
concluded that only a phase-out ‘will adequately control’ the life cycle of asbestos exposure 
risks that occur whenever the substance is mined, used in manufacturing, released into the 
environment through deteriorating asbestos-containing products, or is disposed.15 Despite the 
well-documented dangers of asbestos, this regulation was struck down by a reviewing court 
which concluded that the agency had failed to perform sufficiently detailed cost-benefit 
analyses of banning not only each particular use of asbestos, but also of all intermediate 
alternatives short of a ban. The court required such highly detailed proof, on a product-by-
product basis, that benefits outweighed costs, as to render the Toxic Substances Control Act 
virtually impotent as a regulatory tool.16 
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The Corrosion Proof Fittings court applied a kind of reverse precautionary principle. Its 
decision essentially declared that for a substance known to cause serious and irreversible 
damage to health, lack of certainty concerning the costs and benefits of all regulatory 
alternatives should be used as a reason for not regulating it. The court echoed critics of the 
precautionary principle who charge that precautionary regulation may create greater risks than 
it prevents, by chastising EPA for failing to perform detailed analyses of the risks of any 
potential substitutes for asbestos. Surprisingly, however, the court upheld the government’s 
ban on new uses of asbestos without requiring any cost-benefit analysis, noting that ‘EPA 
cannot possibly evaluate the costs and benefits of banning unknown, uninvented products’.17 
This represented a rare endorsement of truly precautionary regulation by permitting future 
products to be banned even before there was clear evidence to confirm that they actually 
caused harm. 
 
While the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision effectively precluded EPA from banning existing 
uses of asbestos, most other developed countries have done so and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has upheld such bans in light of the demonstrated dangers of asbestos. 
As of August 2012, 54 countries, including most EU members, have banned asbestos.18 In 
September 2000, a WTO dispute resolution panel upheld France’s ban on imports of 
chrysotile asbestos, rejecting arguments by Canada that it was an unjustified restriction on 
trade, an argument representatives of the Canadian asbestos industry had raised 
unsuccessfully during the EPA rulemaking.19 The panel concluded that the risks of asbestos 
had been so thoroughly researched that the ban was justified as necessary to protect human 
health. 
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Despite overwhelming proof of harm to health caused by tobacco products, when the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration sought to regulate them stringently, the U.S. Supreme Court 
by a 5-4 vote rejected the agency’s finding that cigarettes were ‘drug delivery devices’ for 
nicotine that could be regulated by the agency.20 The Court refused to apply the Chevron 
doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory directives 
because it did not believe that Congress intended to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco. 
 
Despite some judicial reversals of important regulatory initiatives, the regulatory 
infrastructure of U.S. environmental law generally has survived persistent survived legal 
attacks. In 2001 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected an industry argument that 
unless the Clean Air Act was interpreted to require that regulations be based on cost-benefit 
analysis it would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive.21 
In 2007 the Court by a 5-4 vote ordered EPA to reconsider its refusal to regulate greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions as arbitrary and capricious.22 As a result of this decision, the U.S. EPA 
was able to promulgate regulations controlling GHG emissions under the existing Clean Air 
Act, even though efforts to enact new legislation establishing a comprehensive, national cap-
and-trade program had failed. In June 2012 a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit unanimously rejected all industry challenges to these regulations in a decision 
deferring to EPA’s findings concerning the contribution of GHG emissions to global warming 
and climate change.23 
 
Yet ideological splits over the wisdom of environmental regulation persist in the U.S. 
judiciary. In August 2012 a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
invalidated EPA’s latest effort to control interstate air pollution in a controversial 2-1 
decision.24 The court’s decision was the second time in four years that EPA’s effort to tighten 
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such standards was rejected in court.25 It came despite EPA’s estimates that the new 
regulations would prevent between 13,000 and 34,000 premature deaths each year, generating 
annual benefits of between $120 billion to $280 billion at a projected annual cost of $2.4 
billion. The court’s decision has been sharply criticized as the product of ‘a new breed of 
activist judges [who] are waging a determined and largely successful war on federal 
regulatory agencies’ through the use of ‘legal sophistry, procedural hair-splitting and 
scientific conjecture’ (Pearlstein 2012). 
 
The U.S. Congress also is sharply split on issues of precautionary regulation. The Republican 
takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2010 elections produced the most anti-
environmental house of Congress in U.S. history. In the twenty months that it was in session 
before adjourning on 21 September 2012, the 112th Congress has seen 315 anti-environmental 
measures pass the House.26 Nearly all of these measures have failed to become law because 
they cannot win passage in the U.S. Senate, which is controlled by Democrats more 
sympathetic to environmental regulation. Due to the partisan split in the two houses of 
Congress it has become virtually impossible for Congress to enact any new environmental 
legislation. 
 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY POLICY  
It is far easier to generate political support for controlling risks that cause immediate and 
highly visible harm than it is for regulating less visible risks that cause harm far into the 
future. This is well illustrated by the history of U.S. regulatory policy. The first federal 
regulatory intervention in the U.S. to protect public health was undertaken in 1832 to stop 
steamship boilers from exploding. In 1915 the U.S. Supreme Court issued its first injunction 
to control pollution in order to reduce highly visible damage emissions from copper smelters 
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in Tennessee had caused by destroying all vegetation in a huge swath of land extending far 
into the state of Georgia.27 
 
With the exception of the remarkable public response to the theory that CFCs could deplete 
the ozone lawyer, which led EPA to ban ozone-depleting substances in the early 1970s, U.S. 
regulatory policy has been largely reactive, rather than precautionary. Regulation generally 
has responded only after harm has become manifest. While the dangers of lead and asbestos 
were well-known to scientists in the early 20th century, regulatory policy did not respond to 
them for decades, even as enormous harm to public health accumulated, because the harm 
they caused was not immediately visible (Percival 2006). The eventual, reactive regulatory 
responses to the hazards of gasoline lead additives and worker exposure to asbestos, have 
produced enormous benefits to public health, albeit belatedly. Despite this history, U.S. 
regulatory policy has not aggressively focused on potentially emerging risks posed by the 
products of biotechnology or nanotechnology (Lin 2007). 
 
Political theory teaches that it is a veritable miracle that the U.S. has such comprehensive and 
durable environmental statutes. ‘It is much easier to understand why environmental laws are 
needed than it is to comprehend how they came to be adopted’ (Percival 1998). Mancur 
Olson’s classic work The Logic of Collective Action argues that the political process will not 
favour collective action to impose concentrated costs on well-organized industry groups in 
order to prevent diffuse harms to the public (Olson 1965). Yet this theory seemingly is 
contradicted by the remarkable burst of legislative activity to protect the environment by the 
U.S. Congress during the 1970s and 1980s. As noted above, many of these statutes were the 
product of a highly publicized ‘trigger’ event, such as Earth Day, Love Canal, the Bhopal 
tragedy, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Percival 1998). 
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Today, however, even highly publicized environmental disasters such as the April 2010 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster in Japan have not generated any legislative response. The 1989 Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in Alaska broke more than a decade of legislative gridlock over oil pollution 
legislation, resulting in the adoption by Congress of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (‘OPA90’). 
Yet because legislators always seem to respond to the last disaster, OPA90 focused almost 
entirely on the kind of oil spill that had just occurred -- a spill from a tanker transporting oil. 
The law did not focus on pollution from offshore oil platforms, the genesis of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster. Indeed, OPA90 actually limits liability for oil spills from offshore facilities 
to $75 million plus removal costs.28 Yet in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
efforts to repeal this cap failed to pass either house of Congress. One could view these 
developments as another indication of a perceived ‘crisis’ -- this time the global financial 
crisis -- serving as a ‘trigger’ for reactive policies, this time policies founded on the false 
dichotomy that regulation inevitably hurts the economy. 
 
What does seem clear is that the bipartisan consensus concerning the importance of 
environmental protection that spawned ambitious U.S. environmental legislation during the 
1970s and 1980s has now disappeared. During the 2012 U.S. presidential election campaign, 
the political parties and the electorate were sharply split in their views concerning regulatory 
policy. Republicans blamed environmental regulation for high unemployment and slow 
economic growth while Democrats generally tried to change the subject. Yet until the 2008 
global financial crisis, which produced the greatest economic downturn next to the Great 
Depression, the U.S. economy prospered despite stringent environmental regulation. 
Extractive industries, newly freed from the restrictions of campaign finance laws by the 
29 
Supreme Court’s decision that they have a First Amendment free speech right to spend 
directly on election campaigns,29 flooded the airwaves with ads blaming high unemployment 
on environmental regulation. Opponents of regulation usually describe it as ‘job-killing’ and 
never as ‘life-saving’. 
 
Despite all-time record temperatures and hurricanes that have caused unprecedented 
devastation to coastal areas, climate change has disappeared from U.S. political discourse. 
During the 2012 U.S. presidential candidates climate change was never once mentioned 
during three 90-minute debates between the presidential candidates. President Obama’s 
reelection in November 2012 and his political party’s gains in both houses of Congress 
indicate that his opponents’ anti-regulatory rhetoric was not decisive with voters.  But there is 
little prospect of bipartisan agreement new on environmental measures, though legislation 
purporting to bar U.S. airlines from paying EU emissions charges was signed into law on 
November 27. Thus, Vogel’s theory that the U.S. has become less precautionary than the EU 
because of political polarization is amply supported by recent events.  
 
The political process rarely rewards government officials for focusing on problems that have 
not been obvious enough to generate demands for immediate action. Vogel explains the EU’s 
adoption of REACH as reflecting ‘not only the influence of the precautionary principle, but 
also several highly visible food safety failures in Europe, as well as the ongoing debate over 
the safety of GMOs’ (Vogel 2012: 177). By adopting the REACH program the EU set in 
motion a long-term process for uncovering chemical risks that will greatly facilitate 
precautionary regulation. Although the U.S. has long resisted adopting a similar testing 
program for chemicals, there is one rare example of U.S. officials trying to discover risks in 
advance of harm. For several years the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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(NASA) has been searching for ‘Near Earth objects’, such as asteroids, that may pose a 
danger of colliding with Earth.30. 
 
Vogel also argues that the U.S. is less precautionary than the EU because greater emphasis on 
risk assessment and less deferential U.S. judicial review has ‘increased the level of scientific 
evidence necessary to justify new risk regulations’ (Vogel 2012). While there is some recent 
evidence to support this claim, the Supreme Court’s encouragement of risk assessment in its 
1980 ‘Benzene’ decision has not greatly handicapped regulatory agencies. Even the Ethyl 
Corporation court expressly endorsed risk assessment in its 1976 decision endorsing 
precautionary regulation. The very year after it decide the ‘Benzene’ case the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld OSHA regulations to protect workers from exposure to cotton dust because they 
were supported by an agency risk assessment.31 The Court rejected the argument that OSHA 
was required to base its decisions on cost-benefit analysis, wisely eschewing an effort to 
paralyze regulatory action. 
 
Yet Vogel clearly is correct that the U.S. judiciary has impeded precautionary regulation in 
several cases, including the decision to strike down regulation of tobacco by the federal Food 
and Drug Administration,32 the invalidation of EPA’s asbestos phase-out regulations,33 and 
the August 2012 decision striking down EPA’s latest effort to tighten controls on interstate air 
pollution.34 Like Congress, the judiciary remains closely split between opponents and 
proponents of precautionary regulation. The opponents have been particularly active in 
striking down regulations issued in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Financial Reform 
legislation, seizing on vague language in the statutory charter of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to demand that SEC rules meet ever more stringent cost-benefit tests.35 
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The enormous (and growing) political clout of regulated industries in the U.S. essentially 
guarantees that U.S. regulatory agencies cannot adopt overly precautionary policies that 
significantly over-regulate industry. Thus, it is hardly surprising that it has been virtually 
impossible to identify instances in which precaution has produced significant over-regulation 
by U.S. agencies. While one can identify some U.S. regulatory policies that are more stringent 
in controlling particular risks than in the EU, the EU clearly has been more innovative in 
embracing precautionary regulation through programs like REACH, WEEE and RoHS. These 
programs have been enormously influential in the development of regulatory policy 
throughout the world. Thus, despite current retrenchment in the U.S., the forces of 
globalization and the EU’s warmer embrace of the precautionary principle ultimately may 
move the world in a more precautionary direction.  
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